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RUDOLF VON JHERING
IREDELL JENKINS*

I
It is often the fate of the giants of thought to have their names
live on while their doctrines are neglected, and even for their reputations to wax as their I!nfluence wanes. Indeed, this happens at some
periods to the work that all such men leave behind them; it is
esteemed but not appreciated, acknowledged but not cultivated. The
precise reasons for this fall into oblivion vary with every individual
case, but there is one factor that is common and constant: the prominence within the work of these men of ideas that push inquiry beyond
the comfortable limits that are conventionally accepted. These ideas

raise problems that upset complacence, they ask unexpected questions, they propose investigations never hitherto undertaken or even

contemplated, and they require a radical effort of assimilation. The
very characteristics that make such work great, and compel our attention and admiration, at the same time threaten our established

modes of thought and challenge us to a thorough reconsideration of
facts and doctrines that we had thought to have settled. So it is not
surprising that, while such work commands the respect of all, it often
fails to win the dedicated allegiance of any. The contributions that it
makes are gladly accepted, and its influence is felt in a diffuse way;
but it does not inspire even its adherents to insist on the questions
that its author felt most urgently, or to press further the insights
that he regarded as his most significant.
The case of Rudolf von Jhering is a particularly tragic-and. withal
instructive-instance of this phenomenon. The quality of Jhering's
work was recognized from the first; his personality made him one of
the leaders of the juristic life of his time; and his writings were
widely read and discussed, not alone in Germany but throughout
the western cultural community. Jhering undoubtedly exerted a
very strong influence, not only on those individuals and schools whose
ideas obviously derived from his thought, but also on all who have
since dealt with the problems of jurisprudence. As Julius Stone has
put it, no later legal theorist has been "able to write as if the Scherz
und Ernstand Zweck i Recht had not been written."'
Indeed, the impact of Jhering was greater than that of many men
of commensurate stature because he was such a many-sided thinker;
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Alabama. The author gratefully
acknowledges assistance from the University of Alabama Research Committee which supported the work of which this article forms a part.
1. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 314 (1946).
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he himself absorbed many influences and held them in unstable solution, so he in turn influenced diverse movements which had little
else in common. I think-and shall later argue-that Jhering failed
to achieve a successful synthesis of his acute insights into the nature
and the workings of law; he penetrated deeply and variously into
his subject, but'he never worked through it to a complete and lucid
vision. Yet just because of this partial failure, he was able to give
impetus and direction to many different lines of inquiry and to play
a leading part in the development of several divergent schools of
thought. The best known aspect of his work is, of course, the doctrine that law is a means to an end, an instrument of human purposes;
it is this emphasis that has been developed into-and by-the jurisprudence of interests. But there are numerous other strands of
Jhering's thought that, while not so well known, have also been
influential. His definition of the state as essentially a locus of power
and an agent of compulsion contributed greatly to the imperative
theory of law, and aligned him with the broad movement of legal
positivism. But his steadfast insistence that law must remain sensitive and subordinate to values that are prior to it and speak through
it associates him with the current of legal idealism. His earlier work
in the tradition of legal conceptualism-which culminated in Der
Geist des r6mischen Rechts (The Spirit of Roman Law)-and his continued emphasis on the need for clarity and precision in legal concepts, contributed to the growth of analytical jurisprudence. His
strong sense of the relation between law and history, and his demand
that law be appropriate to its setting, served to extend and amplify
the school of historical jurisprudence, and helped to create the
sociology of law. His insistence that the life of the law is a constant
struggle, and that law must realize purposes as well as merely reflect
them, encouraged the movement of legislative reform and stimulated
the work of the legal realists. Jhering put his mark indelibly upon
each of these facets of legal thought and practice, with the result that
his work has borne a rich fruit; and the fact that this has sometimes
involved some rather startling mutations of the original seed-ideas
is not cause for surprise-or even necessarily for regret.
But despite this varied and pervasive influence, I think it is
nevertheless the case that those insights that are the most profound
and suggestive in Jhering, and to which he himself attached chief
value, have either been neglected by later thought or have been
radically subverted from the direction in which he intended them to
carry. This is a thesis to which I shall return at the conclusion of
this essay, there to argue it in some detail. Very briefly, the contention I would urge is this: Whereas Jhering sought to turn inquiry
toward the foundations of the legal order, and to understand law as
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a- coherent element within a total human and cultural' setting, his
successors have been content to confine their attention to the operations of the legal apparatus, and to -trace the relations of law no
further than to political and economic forces.
When the first volume of Der Zweck ira Recht 2 was published in
1877, Jhering was a man of almost 60, with a substantial life's work
already achieved. In the preface to that work he has told us of the
chain of thought that led to it; and he has described, almost apologetically, the manner in which an apparent digression to an historical analysis gradually developed into a radical theoretical
reconstruction. The account of this genesis is so revealing that it is
well to let Jhering speak for himself. The preface begins in these
terms:
The book, of which I herewith present the first half to the public, is an
offshoot of my work on the Spirit of Roman Law ("Geist des rmischen
Rechts"). The last volume of that treatise (Part III, division 1), which'
appeared in 1865 in its first edition, concluded with the establishment of
a theory of "rights in the subjective sense." In it I gave a definition
differing from the prevailing one, by putting Interest instead of Will at
the basis of law. The further justification and illustration of this point of
view was reserved for the succeeding volume. In the course of its development, however, I soon went beyond this point of view. The concept of
Interest made it necessary for me to consider Purpose, and "right in the
subjective sense" led me to "right in the objective sense." Thus the
original object of my investigations was transformed into one of much
greater extent, into the object of the present book, viz., Law as a means
to an end.
The fundamental idea of the present work consists in the thought that
Purpose is the creator of the entire law; that there is no legal rule which
does not owe its origin to a purpose, i.e., to a practical motive.
[This] problem.., placed me in a domain where I am a dilettante. If
I ever deplored the fact that the period of my development came at a
time when philosophy was in discredit, it was in connection with the
present work.
I must be prepared for readers who will judge the value of the work
only by the particular views contained in it. It is the usual standard of
the jurist in judging works of his profession. In a work which, like the
present, pursues no practical or dogmatic purpose, but takes for its task
the presentation of the whole connection of law, such judgment would
show the lack of all understanding for the meaning of the problem (pp.
liii-lvi).
2. The English translation by Isaac Husik was published as JHEBING, LAW
AS A MEANS TO AN END (1913). All citations are to this edition and, for the
convenience of the reader, are given in the text, in parentheses, after the
passages quoted.
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This passage raises several points that are of capital importance
and that represent a clear progression in the direction and intention
of Jhering's thought. First, there is the shift from Will to Interest
as the basis of law. This in turn leads on to the concept of Purpose,
which is recognized as the objective source and justification for the
subjective rights that Interest asserts. This means that real Purposes
are to be the criteria for, evaluating and judging actual Interests.
This shifts attention from the presently established body of legal
concepts to the array of situations and goals with which law deals.
This entails a theoretical consideration of the legal order as a whole,
and not a mere solution of discrete and limited legal issues. And this,
finally, is recognized as requiring a philosophical manner of treatment: i.e., one that seeks to place law within an inclusive metaphysical and moral framework.
All of this sums up to the fact that Jhering was embarking on an
extraordinarily ambitious undertaking. He meant to make the foundations of the legal order far broader and deeper than they had
hitherto been, and to relate law to the whole of man's physical and
spiritual life. But-and this is the crux of my thesis-I think it
abundantly clear that this has not been the outcome of his work.
His impact, paradoxically, has gone rather in the opposite direction.
All of the earlier mentioned schools that have felt his influence have
tended, in their various and private ways, toward a narrow conception of the basis of law and a limited view of its functions. The
evidence is overwhelming that Jhering consciously intended another
"Copernican revolution," though one moving toward quite another
conclusion than that wrought by Kant. But, in the process of being
absorbed, his work was shattered into fragments; and the different
schools that built separately upon these were at one in treating law
in largely technical rather than philosophical terms. They looked for
the meaning of the law in the uses to which it was actually put
rather than in the ends that it should ideally serve. They emphasized
the notions of subjectivity, interest, practice, and technique, while
they neglected those of objectivity, purpose, theory, and value.
This radical reversal of Jhering's intention is seen with special
force in the work of the school of Interessenjurisprudenz,which derived most directly from him.. Such men as Rilmelin, Oertmann,
Heck, Binder, Isay, and the others who contributed to the formation
of this schobl all acknowledged their debt to Jhering. With certain
reservations in some cases, but always with enthusiasm, he was
hailed as the man who had exposed the futility of conceptualistic
jurisprudence, had rescued law from logic and returned it to experience, and had 'for the first time made law clearly conscious of its
mission as an instrument through which men assert and protect
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their interests. In short, Jhering is regarded by his successors as
the inventor of what Riimelin calls the "teleological method" in
jurisprudence'and what Heck calls the "genetic theory of interests."
But this chorus of praise, which was clearly deserved, hides a common misunderstanding which largely vitiates it. For all of these
jurists, with the possible exception of Binder in some of his writings,
failed signally to grasp-or at least to exploit-those ideas that
Jhering regarded as most significant and far-reaching.
This misunderstanding centers around the exact nature and status
of the goals that law seeks-of the ends to which it is a means. As it
develops, it issues in two components, one going to matters of substance, the other to matters of procedure. I think it is clear from
the passage quoted earlier-and I will later introduce more evidence
on this point-that Jhering thought of the "purposes" or "ends" of
law as grounded in the real character of man and the world; they
are integral to the general human situation, and hence quite independent of the desires and preferences of individual men and of
the interests that these men assert. Furthermore, he thought that
these purposes, and particularly the systematic whole that they
form, could be reached only by a philosophical analysis that went
toward the metaphysical basis of these purposes and the moral values
that they furthered. In sum, Jhering conceived of purposes in objective terms, and he assigned them priority over subjective interests. Interessenjurisprudenz rejected both of these insights, and
pushed its inquiries in other directions by other methods. This difference, which seems quite clearly to have been the result of a
conscious and deliberate choice, is brought out very sharply in an
address by Philipp Heck in which he traces the development of this
school and gives full credit to Jhering for having expounded its
seminal ideas. Having made this acknowledgement, Heck then goes
on to criticize Jhering on the grounds that he "did not draw the
consequences of his theory" and "did not sufficiently analyze . . .
the effects of law on actual life."3 Heck makes his objections explicit
in these terms:
He [Jhering] emphasizes the protection of interests, and characterizes it
as the object of legislation; "Purpose in Law" is the title of his most
important later publication. To my mind, however, it is not sufficient to
consider the purpose of law. The fundamental truth from which we must
proceed is that each command of the law determines a conflict of interests;
it originates from a struggle between opposing interests, and represents as
it were the resultant of these opposing interests. Protection of interests
through law never occurs in a vacuum. .. : If we confine ourselves to an
examination of the purpose of a law we see only the interest which has
3. Heck, Interessenjurisprudenz in THE
(Schoch transl. 1948).

JURISPRUDENCE

OF

INTERESTS

35
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prevailed. But the concrete content of the legal.rule, the degree in which
its purpose is achieved, depends upon the weight of those interests which
were vanquished ....

Therefore, the teleological jurisprudence of Jhering

is not sufficient. It needs to be deepened with the aid of an analysis of
interests, or, in other words, the theory of conflicts. For each rule of law
the conflict of interests which underlies it must be analyzed.4
The doctrines embodied in this passage, which summarizes the
outlook of the jurisprudence of interests and forecasts its outcome,
represent a complete inversion of Jhering's mature intentions. Law
is here regarded as a technical, not a theoretical, science. Emphasis
is placed upon private conflicts rather than public policy. Jhering
stated perfectly explicitly, on several occasions, that he was eager
to effect a reformulation of the classical Natural Law doctrine that
would preserve the breadth and depth of its vision while eliminating
its dogmatic and regressive features. That is, he meant jurisprudence
to be focused on what is ultimate, latent, and ideal in the life of the
law. His successors focused it on what is immediate, obvious, and
actual.
It is a commonplace that a thinker cannot control the course of
the ideas that he has fathered. Nonetheless it is unusual for an author
who expressed himself with such explicitness and power as Jhering
to have his insights so blunted and his intentions so distorted as they
were. This was due in part, no doubt, to the temperaments and
interests of the men who took up and cultivated his ideas. It was
certainly due far more to the legal and social conditions that held
at the time; these brought certain issues and problems to the fore,
and so fostered the development of doctrines and techniques that
promised to be effective in dealing with these matters of primary
import. But even these factors taken in conjunction, influential as
they may be, are not adequate to account for the extreme metamorphosis that Jhering's doctrines underwent. In addition, one is led
to suspect a critical failure somewhere in Jhering's own development of his theory, with the result that basic ideas that were intrinsically sound and fruitful did not carry conviction, and so were
neglected, while other more superficial aspects of this theory were
given an undue prominence. I think that this is indeed the case.
Furthermore, I think that the problems to which Jhering was calling
attention, and the approach to them that he sought to establish, remain of vital significance to the life of the law. So as I trace the
line of Jhering's argument, I shall be concerned to detect, if possible,
the flaws that made it miss its mark.
4. Id. at 35-36.
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II
The argument that Jhering set out to develop in Law as a Means to
an End is complicated and incomplete. When Jhering interrupted
his work on The Spirit of Roman Law-which he had hitherto regarded as the crowning achievement of his career-in order, to
explore his new conception of "law as a means to an end," he expected this to be a relatively straightforward task that could be
accomplished in a brief interlude. After all, as he tells us, he had
in mind but one "fundamental idea," which appeared quite simple
and obvious: "that there is no legal rule which does not owe its
origin to a purpose." (p. liv) And the book that he planned was to
be devoted solely to "the establishment of this principle, and to the
detailed exposition and illustration of it in connection with the most
important phenomena of law." (p. liv) To a man with Jhering's
vast and intimate knowledge of the law, both as an historical occurrence and as an actual technique, the second part of this undertaking
-the "exposition and illustration" of his principle-must indeed have
presented itself as an easy exercise. Unfortunately, Jhering never
got to it. For the prior task of "establishing" his principle soon led
him to the realization that "a book which intends to make purpose
the foundation of the entire system of law must give an account of
the concept of purpose." (p. liv) The rest of Jhering's effort was to be
spent in discharging this obligation, as the seemingly limpid and
self-evident truth that law is a creature of purpose gradually disclosed itself to be a mass of unresolved ambiguities and untested assumptions. The attempt to clarify and justify his newly-won conception of law thus prevented Jhering from ever applying this systematically to an analysis of legal phenomena. It seems probable
that Jhering himself realized only gradually the extent to which his
inquiry was being bent from its original intention; and then he
accepted this fate unwillingly, and continually fought to counteract
it by anticipating and elaborating the mature legal consequences of
the primitive roots of the law with which he became increasingly
involved. Thus the exposition of the thesis of purposiveness in Law
as a Means to an End is extremely disconnected aAd repetitive, and
the chief difficulty in summarizing it is to disentangle its various
strands and present them as steps in what is actually, underneath its
surface disorder, a closely-knit logical argument.
It is perhaps as well to begin at the end. The "exhaustive definition" of law at which Jhering finally arrives is this: "Law is the sum
of the conditions of social life in the widest sense of the term, as
secured by the power of the State through the means of external
compulsion." (p. 380).
This definition contains two principal elements, each of which-
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as we shall see-is itself complex: there is a system of purposes, and
there is a system of force through which these are realized. These
purposes, as they are usually conceived by jurisprudence, issue from
the various interests that are urged by individuals and groups within
society; similarly, the agency through which these interests act, and
that serves and protects them, is conceived as the established body of
substantive and procedural law. So it is the frequent habit of juristic
thought to accept these two elements-human interests and the legal
order-as primitive data upon which to base inquiry and build
theories. Jhering, to the contrary, treats these elements as the
sophisticated outcomes of complex processes, and his concern is to
identify their sources and trace their genesis. In brief, the questions
with which Jhering is fundamentally concerned, though he nowhere
asks them explicitly, are: Why and How is Law?
In any inquiry of this sort, which goes toward origins, the starting
point is of the utmost significance. Jhering is very consciously cutting behind a great deal of what is assumed in most legal studies.
But like any thinker engaged in a similar quest, he must make
certain assumptions of his own; and some of these will almost certainly be unconscious and hence unexamined.
The foundation on which Jhering rests his argument is the principle of Sufficient Reason, which holds that "nothing ever happens of
itself ('causa sui), for everything that happens ... is the consequence
of another antecedent change. . . " (p. 1) He maintains that this
Law of Causality is both "postulated by our thinking, and confirmed
by experience" (p. 1) and so constitutes as firm a basis as any that
theory can hope to secure. This is a sound contention, for rational
inquiry is futile unless there is an objective order and connection
that supports our observations and inferences. Furthermore, reliance
upon this principle has the great advantage of asserting the unity
of man and nature-of regarding man as a coherent part of a larger
panorama-and so opens the way for the study of man in other than
only psychological and social terms.
The next step in this argument is the identification of the type of
causality that operates in the human context. What factors govern
human action? Jhering answers this by drawing a sharp distinction
between matter and life, physical nature and the human will. The
principle of Sufficient Reason holds equally in both of these realms;
but the type of causality is radically different in the two cases. Physical nature exemplifies only mechanical or efficient causes. The will
knows only psychological or final causes. Matter reacts to the past.
Life reaches toward the future. The animating force of life is the
will; and that which gives direction to the will is purpose. In sum,
"life is the practical application, by way of purpose, of the external
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world to one's own existence" (p. 6); and "purpose is the idea of a
future event which the will essays to realize." (p. 7)
There are two points to be noticed about this phase of the argument. In the first place, it disrupts the continuity that Jhering had
first seemed to establish between man and the rest of nature. Human
behavior is now referred to a distinctive principle, and the human
situation-as regards both its structure and its end-is treated as
unique. It is doubtful if Jhering fully realized this outcome of his
argument, for he continues to personify "Nature" and to speak of
"her" intentions and arrangements for man. But the inherent limitations of this position nevertheless made themselves felt: they imposed apon Jhering an anthropocentric outlook that confined and
distorted his later efforts to grasp the "system of human purposes"
and narrowed his view of the "conditions of life" that are the proper
concern of law. I shall return to this matter, and deal with it more
fully, at the conclusion of this essay.
The other point is of more immediate importance. The argument
sketched above leads to the conclusion that "will means the maintenance of one's own causality over against the external world." (p.
17) To accept this conclusion without qualification is to espouse the
doctrine of egoism, which asserts "the exclusive tendency of the will
to one's own self . . ." (p. 24) and holds that the living creature
always and inevitably "does everything for its own sake." (p. 23)
Jhering was very conscious of this problem; he returned to it over
and over again, as he encountered it in different contexts and from
different points of view; and the terms in which he conceived the
issue and sought to resolve it are of fundamental importance, as they
exerted a strong influence on his theory of law.
It is as difficult as it is important to be clear on this matter, for
Jhering's treatment of it vacillated between different interpretations,
and his final doctrine contains elements of each of these without
achieving a reconciliation of them. The clue to unraveling this confusion lies, I think, in the recognition that Jhering dealt with the
problem, on different occasions, on two quite distinct levels of analysis. In some places, the approach is abstract and logical, and the
solution proposed is cast in technical philosophical and psychological
terms. In other places, the approach is concrete and empirical, and
the solution is cast in historical and politico-legal terms. Finally, the
occasions on which the first of these manners of treatment is employed are by far the more explicit and prominent, and are commonly
accepted-as seems to have been Jhering's intention-as representing
his final conclusions on the subject. This, I think, is a mistake that
has hindered a just -understanding and appreciation of Jhering's
thought. For, I would argue, it is the second manner of dealing with
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this issue that Jhering employed most of the time-especially in his
legal analyses-and that really embodies his mature views.
Jhering's explicit theoretical solution of this issue is simple and
straightforward, and has become famous. This consists in positing a
"system of human purposes" that contains two main poles: egoism,
or individual self-assertion, on the one hand; self-denial, or ethical
self-assertion, on the other. Purposes of the first kind are those "by
which he [the individual] holds in view solely himself, and not
society, i.e., any other person or a higher purpose." (p. 44) Purposes
of the second kind consist in "the feeling on the part of the agent of
the ethical destiny of his being, i.e., his feeling that existence was
given to him not merely for himself, but also for the service of
humanity." (p. 45) This is to say that men are motivated by two
radically different, and quite separate, types of purpose, one of which
is self-seeking while the other is self-denying. This in turn is to say
that men can be moved by two distinct sorts of psychological force,
each of which appeals to one of these types of purpose. And this,
finally, means that there are two different lines along which the
effort to organize men-to unite these separate individuals in peace
and order-can proceed. One of these works on the egoistic motives
of men, seeking to convince them that each can best serve his private
interests if they agree on certain common purposes. This effort
culminates in the State and in Law. The other approach works on
the altruistic motives of men, seeking to persuade them that their
true happiness lies in the cultivation of the higher sentiments of Duty
and Love. This effort culminates in Morality.
This is the logical schema that serves as the ostensible framework
for Jhering's theory of law. And while there is no doubt that its
tenets exerted a strong influence on the development of certain of
his doctrines, an analysis cast too rigidly in these terms would yield
a seriously narrow and distorted account of his theory as a whole.
For he often qualifies the stark abstractions of this thesis; and he
far more often simply neglects them, as his attention is centered on
the tasks of tracing the actual course of legal development and then
applying the insights thus gained to an understanding of mature law.
The theory sketched above asserts a series of dichotomies: between
two forces within every man, between man and man, between men
and the group, and between human institutions. It treats the components of these various dyads as though they were radically distinct
and sharply separated, and so as suffering no inter-action. It issues,
finally, in the view that law is exclusively an instrument of compulsion, appealing only to man's selfish purposes, and using the power
of this appeal to impose upon men the restraints and to gain from
men the acquiescences that are deemed necessary to a life in com-
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mon. In short, law is here interpreted as merely "the politics of
force" (p. 187), "the intelligent policy of power." (p. 283)
Such a tidy and uncomplicated theory has undoubted attractions;
it even has a certain heuristic value. But it is also a tissue of abstractions, and its superficial clarity is a false gloss of the profound complexities of the human situation. That is, this theory is a large-scale
case of what Whitehead has called "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness," which consists in mistaking categories of thought for aspects
of reality.5 .Now, despite his continued: flirtations with this fallacy,
Jhering never really succumbed to its temptations: rather, he
exploited these abstractions for the structure and stability they could
give to. his argument, and then he drew their sting by dissolving
them in the flux of historical and legal events. What saved Jhering
here was partly his intimate acquaintance, and close contact, with
the actual institutions and operations of law. What saved him even
more was his vivid sense of society as prior to the state,. coeval with
human existence, and exerting a pervasive influence on the characters
and sentiments of men. This theme is stated prominently at the commencement of Jhering's exposition: "Society must accordingly be
defined as the actual organization of life for and by others and (since
the individual is what he is, only through others) as the indispensable
form of life for oneself; society is therefore really the form of human
life in general. Human life and social life are synonymous." (p. 67)
This theme recurs constantly, and joined with it is the explicit rejection of those schools of thought that "wish to isolate the individual,
separating him artificially from his historical connection with society,
and then to present over against such merely theoretical being-forhimself of an individual, his actual life in society and being-forothers." (p. 44) Holding such views as these, Jhering obviously could
not adhere strictly and steadfastly to the dichotomies that his theory
demanded. This unresolved tension sometimes leads to logical inconsistencies; and there are occasions when it blurs connections that
would otherwise be obvious. But this is probably more than compensated by the fact that it gives to Jhering's work a combined
explicitness of structure and richness of detail that are rare among
legal theorists.
With this background, we can return to the line of Jhering's argument. We left him at the point where he drew the distinction between
egoistic and social motives, and stated his (theoretical) intention of
treating law as issuing from and concerned with only the first of
these. Accepting this analysis, the central question that arises from
it is this: "How can the world exist under a regime of egoism, which
5. WHITEHEAD, ScIENCE AND THE MODERN WoRLD chs. 3, 4
PROCESS AND REALrrY 11 (1929).

(1939);

WHiTEHEAD,
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desires nothing for the world, but everything for itself alone?" (p.

25)

When the problem is posed in these terms-and it must be

remembered that this is largely a heuristic device, adopted as a means

to isolate the phenomena of legal development in order that they
may be more conveniently studied-there is only one way in which

it can be solved: "the world exists by taking egoism into its service,
paying it the reward which it desires." (p. 25) This problem presses
upon humanity from its beginnings, and long prior to the emergence
of any such institutions as law and the state, nature solves it through
the agency of pleasure and pain: man is simply so constituted that
those acts that further the survival of the individual and the species
are on the whole pleasurable, while those that threaten this are
painful. Jhering enunciates this doctrine in terms of a personified
Nature that purposely arranges matters so; contemporary thought
enunciates it in terms of evolution and adaptation. But these stipulations come to the same thing, and both are really tautologies: man
survives because he is equipped for, survival., Men assert their
private interests through egoism. It is for the same reason exactly
that they cooperate with one another and pursue what appear to
be common goals: each has his own interests exclusively in mind,
and "the co-operation of a number of people for the same purpose is
brought about only by the converging of all the interests upon the
same point. No one perhaps has in view the purpose as such, but
every one has his own interest in view, a subjective purpose which
is quite different from the general objective one, but the coincidence
of their interests with the general purpose brings it about that every
one in taking pains for himself at the same time becomes active for
the general purpose." (p. 28)
As societies grow in size and complexity, this primitive and spontaneous solution of the problem of egoism proves inadequate. The
breakup of the immediate face-to-face group, the division of labor,
the interdependence of peoples, the scope of men's undertakingsall of these require a more explicit organization. As Jhering puts it,
all of the arrangements of civilized life depend upon the presupposition that "society shall always find hands and brains ready for all
needs and purposes. . . ." (p. 66) Men must be assigned and kept to
tasks; order and continuity must be preserved; the work that is
necessary must be done -without interruption or conflict. So, at the
more sophisticated level of Jhering's concern, the basic problem is
this: "What guarantee does society possess that everyone will do his
share in realizing the principle upon which her whole existence
depends, namely that the individual exists for'society?" (p. 70)
The answer lies in the fact that there is a "social mechanics . . .by
which society sets the will in motion for her purposes." (pp. 72-73)

19601

JHERING

Society acts upon individuals through the two basic motives of
egoism and altruism, which Jhering now calls "levers of social
motion." The egoistic levers are two: reward and coercion. The
altruistic levers are also two: the Feeling of Duty and Love. These
latter belong to the province of morality, whose function it is to
develop and train them to the service of mankind. That is, morality
is the science of cultivating the inherent capacities of men for love
and duty, and then of using these for the purposes of general human
and social betterment. Of the egoistic levers, reward is operated by
commerce. All men act to the end of gaining reward for their effort:
they wish to further their interests and realize their purposes. Commerce uses this motive, or lever, to promote social organization and
to assure the satisfaction of human wants. This is accomplished by
a complex set of arrangements that brings it about that men will
be able to attain their own separate goals just to the extent that
they contribute what society needs of them. That is, commerce is
a gradually evolved and continually developing system that encourages men to exchange their goods and services, to pool their talents,
and to concentrate their efforts in such ways as will most effectively
promote the common interest. The account that Jhering gives of
commerce, tracing this from the untutored efforts of men to secure
their primitive needs to the highly organized economic systems of
the present, is a fascinating one. And it is perhaps in this treatment
that one feels and regrets the most keenly the contradiction between
Jhering's theoretical commitments and his empirical convictions.
His theory dictates the view that commerce has largely "evolved
independently" of law and the state. His experience teaches him
otherwise and better. The former controls in this case, and as a
consequence, though Jhering frequently touches upon and illuminates
the relations of law and commerce, he never treats of them systematically or even explicitly.
The second lever that society has available to act upon men is
that of coercion. And the organization of coercion culminates in the
state and law. By coercion, Jhering understands "the realization of
a purpose by means of mastering another's will." (p. 176) He who
coerces another says in effect: "I have the power to do such-and-such
-e.g., kill or enslave or impoverish you-but I will refrain if you
will in turn subordinate your will to mine, accede to my directions,
and contribute to my undertakings." He who submits to coercion
sacrifices some of his purposes in order to preserve others that he
regards as more vital. Coercion thus represents a victory of intelligence and foresight over force: it embodies a compromise in which
each party's interests are better served than they would be by the
unrelenting extremes of victory and defeat that follow the use of
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blind power.
Having established this definition, Jhering sets out to trace the
various forms that coercion takes-the modes of organization through
which it is at once exerted and controlled-until it arrives at the concepts of the state and law. Among the principal steps in this
development with which Jhering deals in detail are slavery, peace by
treaty, protection of person and property, the family, contractual
obligation, partnership, and association. The constant direction of
this process is toward "the social organization of coercion." (p. 218)
The problem that underlies this process, and to which it seeks a
solution, is everywhere the same: it is that "of bringing the preponderance of force on the side of right." (p. 218) The danger that men
in society always face is that power will fall into the hands of a
minority group and will be used to further its interests without
measure, with a disregard for the proper claims of other interests.
The organized effort to prevent this has two sides:
the establishment of the external mechanism of force, and the setting
up of principles to regulate its use. The form of the solution of the
first problem is the State force, that of the second is the Law.
The State is society as the bearer of the regulated and disciplined
coercive force. The sum total of principles according to which it thus
functions by a discipline of coercion, is Law.
Both concepts stand in the relation of mutual dependence: the State
force has need of the law, the law has need of the State force. (pp. 231,
233)
Jhering treats only briefly of the means by which force is effectively concentrated in the state. He regards this as "the proper technique of the political art" (p. 237), and so contents himself with
remarking that it depends on two factors: "the organization of power
in the hands of the State force, and the moral power which the idea
of the State exerts." (p. 236) The state maintains its supremacy
because it commands both fear and respect.
Jhering is now prepared to deal with the problem of law. As his
point of departure, he takes the then current view that defines law
as "the sum of the compulsory rules in force in a State." (pp. 23940) Analysis of this definition discloses two essential elements: "that
of rule, and that of the realization of it through coercion." (p. 240)
The latter of these, since it concerns the "State Force," is handed over
to the "political art," and Jhering does not deal with it further. The
first element in turn has two aspects, one having to do with the form
of such rules, the other with their content. So Jhering's treatment
revolves around two questions. What is the formal structure of the
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legal rule, which distinguishes it from all other modes of coercion?
What is the content of the legal rule; i.e., what are the purposes that
law serves?
The formal character of law-is determined by its being a particular
sort of norm. Jhering's discussion of this concept is, as so often, a
mixture of linguistic, juristic, and historical analysis; so I will make
no attempt to follow all the intricacies of his argument, but will only
summarize its principal steps. There are four of these. First, a norm
is "a proposition of a practical kind, i.e., a direction for human
conduct." (p. 247) Second, norms are binding, i.e., they are imperatives, whether commands or prohibitions; this distinguishes them
from maxims, which are merely advisory. Thirdly, norms may be
either concrete or abstract,depending as they designate conduct in a
particular case or a type of conduct for all cases of a kind. Legal rules
are abstract norms. Fourthly, the distinguishing feature of laws is
that they are abstract norms that are addressed primarily to state
authorities, directing them as to what they are to do. In sum, laws
are abstract imperatives for human conduct, issuing from certain
organs of the state and addressed to other organs, and obligating
these to carry out its directions by means of external compulsion if
necessary.
This mature form of the legal norm is what Jhering calls the
bilaterally binding norm: it requires "that the authority of the State
itself should respect the norms issued by it" and so entails the "selfsubordination" of the state to its laws. (p. 267) Such a norm develops
only gradually from individual commands, which are concrete, and
then from unilaterally binding norms, which obligate only those to
whom they are addressed and not the State authorities who issue
them. The great significance of the bilaterally binding norm lies in
the fact that it is the only agency through which coercion can be
exerted and still can be prevented from becoming arbitrary. Such
norms are the most reliable means that men have found for promoting
the great purposes of order, equality, and personal rights. In sum,
the concept of the legal norm as bilaterally binding supplies the
theoretical terms for the solution of the problem of justice.
But there remains the practical problem: How can this subordination of the state authorities to the laws issued by them be assured in
fact? Jhering deals with this central issue at length, discussing it
under three heads: (1) the motives that the state has for submitting
itself to its own norms; (2) the measures that serve as guarantees of
this self-subordination; (3) the limits-if any-beyond which the
state should be left free to act unilaterally.
(1) The question of motive is briefly disposed of: it is the same
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that "suffices to determine a person to self-control, viz., self-interest."
(p. 282) If the authorities have "insight to understand the teachings
of experience, and moral strength to practise them," then "they make
use of the law because they are convinced that their own interest
properly understood demands it." (p. 282) For it is only by such selfsubordination that the State can hold the respect of its citizens, can
win their willing obedience, and can muster their best efforts behind
its purposes.
(2) The guarantees of this policy are two-fold. One is internal and
rests upon the feeling of right in citizens, which keeps them alert
and sensitive to any falling-away on the part of authority. A society
of free men keeps perpetual watch on its governors, thus stimulating
them toward the right while at the same time warning them against
transgressions.
The other of these guarantees is external, and consists in the
administration of justice. To this, Jhering devotes a long and careful
analysis. He first notes that there are two important factors that
distinguish the judiciary from the other branches of the State's
activities: "the inner peculiarity of the purpose, and the outer
peculiarity of the means and forms by which it is carried out." (p. 289)
As regards the first, the judicial function is exclusively that of
realizing the law; for the judge, the law is an end in itself, to be
faithfully administered as it is. To ask him to correct the law-that-is
in the light-however gained-of what the law-ought-to-be, is to ask
him to encompass a logical contradiction: for the fact that the law isi.e., has been properly promulgated-constitutes proof that it is what
it ought to be, namely, a bilaterally binding norm and hence one that
binds him absolutely as its servant. The executive branch of the
state must also certainly respect the law; but still this remains for it
a means to an end, and hence always to be administered with a view
to the purposes that it is intended to serve and its adaptability to
further these. This latter attitude is, of course, even more characteristic of the legislative function, for which the law is primarily
purposive and only secondarily formal; though the legislature must
obviously be bound by constitutional provisions and its own procedural rules.
It is precisely at this point that Interessenjurisprudenz made one
of its sharpest breaks with Jhering's doctrine. If my argument in the
first section of this paper was correct, the reasons for this are not far
to seek, and they cast an additional light on this matter. Jhering's
successors were unwilling to follow him in his attempt to effect a
thorough reconsideration of the law as a whole, with a consequent
reformulation of its entire corpus. That is, they hung back from
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the effort to recreate the legal order as a coherent purposive system,
consciously based upon a survey of human and social values. But
they did recognize the need to bring the legal order into closer touch
with actual human and social concerns. Jhering's intention would
require that this be done by constitutional and legislative reform,
carried out in the light of philosophical and scientific investigations
of "the system of human purposes" and "the conditions of social
life." Interessenjurisprudenz was more modest: it was content to
throw the problem into the laps of the judges, requiring them to make
all of their decisions in the light of the various economic and political
interests at issue. In short, instead of a single major and carefully
planned reform we are to have an infinite series of discrete ad hoc
adjustments.
The second factor that distinguishes the administration of justice
is its mode of organization. This contains four essential features:
(a) An established body of material, or substantive, law.
(b) An independent and impartial judiciary to whom this law
is handed over to be exclusively applied by it.
(c) The presence of two parties who stand in a position of legal
equality to one another and of legal subordination to the judgeand this even when the state is one of the parties.
(d) A fixed and prescribed mode of procedure, in accord with
which litigation is carried on and a decision reached.
It is only to the extent that these four elements are effectively
present and readily available that the rule of law can be assured.
(3) The question of the limits beyond which the state should not be
bound by its laws is one that Jhering treats in purely practical terms.
He acknowledges that he can see no way toward a theoretical solution of the problem, and he even confesses that to admit such limits
is to contradict the definition of the legal norm. If the state can
unilaterally withdraw from its commitments, default on its promises,
and change its abstract rules with concrete cases, then the concept of
the bilaterally binding norm has been at least seriously weakened.
Yet Jhering insists that the state must in fact have the discretionary
power to indeed thus disregard its edicts. So long as the future defies
precise anticipation, and power cannot predict the conditions it will
meet or the challenges it may encounter, so long must the state be
both free and prepared to cast off the bonds of its past declarations
and to act as the present requires. That is, our ultimate confidence
must be in ourselves as men, for law is but the creature of others
like us; and we cannot legitimately put off our responsibility upon
them. This, it must be emphasized, is in no sense a counsel of expediency. It is merely a reminder that while the virtue of law resides
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in its formal elements, its value springs from its contents. The law
is a system of purposes before it is a system for their realization.
III
This brings us to the final matter to be considered: the content of
law, or the human and social purposes that it is the function of law
to serve. This, as Jhering very well recognizes, is the crux and
climax of his undertaking; and in discussing it I want to return
explicitly to certain suggestions that were made at the commencement
of this paper. I there proposed a two-pronged thesis: first, that Jhering's most important insights, and especially the questions that he
felt to be the most pressing, have been largely neglected or subverted from the direction in which he meant them to lead inquiry;
second, that the cause for this must be sought in some inadequacy
or incompleteness in Jhering's doctrine that prevented it supplying
the necessary support and guidance for such inquiry.
Jhering commences his examination of the content of law by drawing attention to certain distinctions that he regards as essential to a
clarification of the question here at issue. It is frequently charged,
he notes, that this is "an insoluble problem," since "this content is
ever changing, it is one thing here and another there, a chaos in
unceasing flux, without stability, without rule." (p. 325) Jhering
deals with this objection by distinguishing sharply between science
and knowledge on the one hand, action and practice on the other. The
end of the former is "truth, the agreement of the idea with that which
is." (p. 327) So truth when found is "always one" and "remains forever." (p. 326) The end of action and practice is quite other.
These aim at what is "right, i.e., appropriate to the purpose." (p. 326)
So the standard of practice is correctness, which "denotes the agreement of the will with that which should be." (p. 327) All of this,
of course, simply re-emphasizes Jhering's basic contention that law
is a means to an end: since this is the essence of law, its criterion is
effectiveness.
As the next step in his argument, Jhering amplifies this conception
by defining law, "in reference to its content," as "the form of the
security of the conditions of social life, procured by the power of the
State." (p. 330) The key phrase here is "the conditions of life," and
this immediately has ascribed to it two important characteristics: it
is both a relative and-at least in part-a subjective concept. The
conditions of life change with time and place and circumstances:
what is vital here may be trivial elsewhere; problems that press
urgently at one time may not even arise at others; arrangements that
succeed magnificently in some situations fail as dismally in others.
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Since law is a practical discipline, a set of directions for human conduct, it must be sensitive to these changes and keep its content appropriate to them. So "law cannot always make the same regulations,
it must likewise adapt them to the conditions of the people, to their
degree of civilization, to the needs of the time." (p. 328) And again:
14a universal law for all nations and times stands on the same line
with a universal remedy for all sick people." (p. 328) In addition to
this obligation to be appropriate to changing external circumstances,
law must also be appropriate to the varying subjective judgments
that a people make regarding these, and, especially, to the varying
preferences and interests that a people assert. Societies have different
value systems, they do not attach the same significance to the various
goods of life, they disagree as to which goals they will insist upon
and which they will sacrifice. If law is to be true to its function,
it must vary with the ends proposed to it for realization and the
circumstances in which these are to be realized.
With these qualifications and refinements established, Jhering is
ready to proceed to the heart of his problem. He has so far, it must
be borne in mind, been concerned only to note certain important
characteristics of the actual contents of law and of the ends to which
law is directed: namely, that these are relative to circumstances and
are determined by subjective acts of choice and will. Now, it must be
insisted that these characteristics do not preclude the possibility
that there are some purposes that law must always serve and some
conditions that it must always satisfy. It is quite conceivable that it
be of the very essence of law-as a means to an end-that it have a
certain general orientation and content. Then the differences that
are introduced by time and place and circumstance, and are reflected
in actual bodies of law, are but variations on a common theme. This
is a perfectly reasonable view, which has been frequently held. And
it seems clear beyond question that Jhering himself held it. For,
having made the distinctions and qualifications just discussed, he
addresses himself to what he declares to be the central question of
his inquiry. He poses it in these terms: What are the "conditions of
social life," the "requirements upon which the existence of society
depends?" (p. 337)
As I have argued earlier, I think that Thering, in setting forth his
purpose and program in Law as a Means to an End, intended that his
inquiry into these questions should be broadly philosophical, and
that his answers should be cast in metaphysical and moral terms. It
was his evident conviction that the pressing need in jurisprudence
was to conceive the legal order in broader and deeper terms than had
hitherto prevailed, and to establish law in close relationship with the
whole of human life, in its intellectual and spiritual aspects as well
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as its physical and economic. It was Jhering's crowning insight that
law reflects and serves all of the human enterprise, and that this
enterprise is itself grounded in the objective structure of human
nature and the human situation. Here, one must guard carefully
against misunderstanding. This does not mean that law can be based
and built upon any "absolute" truths that are known independently
of reason and experience; it does not mean that there are explicit and
detailed categoricals that all bodies of law must embody just as such;
it does not mean that all actual legal systems are imitations of some
supernal code. It simply means that the "conditions" and "requirements" of life, which are at once the beginning and the end of law,
are determined by the real nature of man and the world. Their
precise content varies with time and place. Men must grasp and
interpret them before they can deal with them, and in this effort they
make mistakes. But these general conditions and requirements of
life are independent of circumstance and preference. They represent
the universal necessities of man's actual lot and the objective goals of
his ideal fulfillment. The human situation being what it in fact is,
there are certain essential requirements that must be met, and certain essential purposes that must be attained, if the human potential
is to be realized. It is these requirements and purposes that constitute
the framework of all law and define its functions. So it is the primary
obligation of legal theory to elucidate these basic and pervasive elements. In sum, the ultimate concern of law must always be with the
real conditions of man's being and well-being.
This is the direction in which Jhering clearly wishes to push legal
theory: toward a consideration of those human and social, those
metaphysical and moral, conditions that are prior to and independent
of the institutions of law, and that define the functions and the goals
of this. Now, if his work is actually to have this impact, then it is
incumbent upon him to sketch the lines that such inquiry is to follow.
That is, he is obliged to identify the extra-legal sources and goals of
law, and to indicate the methods by which these are to be investigated. But this is precisely what Jhering never does. Instead, when
he proceeds to answer his central question, regarding the conditions
and requirements of life, his inquiry is cast in strictly legal terms. He
does not move toward the problems that give rise to law and continue to press upon it, the purposes that animate law, and the values
that law seeks to embody. But the analyses that he offers are directed
solely toward the concepts and techniques that law develops and
employs in dealing with these issues. Whereas we expect to be taken
backstage, so to speak, and shown the human materials, both actual
and ideal, from which the plot of the law evolves, we in fact see these
only as they are reflected in the highly artificial arrangements of
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mature legal systems.
Throughout the long discussions of this matter, which stretch
through a hundred pages, one has the feeling that Jhering is striving
desperately to escape from the legal context and make his way to
those realms-whatever they may be-that underlie law and explain
it. This feeling derives particularly from the manner in which Jhering continually shifts the terms and the direction of his analysis. He
does not develop, cohesively and consecutively, a single line of
argument. Instead, he starts to classify and interpret the contents of
law-the conditions that give rise to law and the purposes law serves
-in one way, develops this slightly, appears to find it unsatisfactory
and so drops it, starts on quite another tack, and repeats this several
times.
He first distinguishes the requirements of life by "reference to the
attitude of the law toward them . . ." (p. 337); this leads to the

familiar classification of the extra-legal, the mixed-legal, and the
purely-legal conditions of society, where these distinctions depend
upon the extent to which the activities and purposes in question require the support of the law. Then he shifts to a consideration of the
subjects that the law recognizes as bearers of rights: this issues in
the distinction of individuals, associations, Church, State, and society
as persons whose purposes the law undertakes to secure. He then
appends to this an analysis of the "three fundamental concepts" of
Things, Obligations, and Crimes. From this he returns, as though
from an interruption, to a further consideration of the vital requirements of these subjects, which he identifies as the physical, economic,
and ideal conditions of life. Finally, he refers back to two earlier
analyses of the "substantial element" in law, or the "highest purposes"
to which law is devoted: these are at once place identified as Order,
Equality, and Subjective Right (pp. 263-267), at another as Independence, Equality, and Justice (pp. 170-175).
I do not at all mean to imply, by this foreshortened and seemingly
sardonic account, that these discussions of Jhering's are either trivial
or irrelevant. To the contrary, they are replete with perceptive insights into the working of law and constructive suggestions for its
improvement. Jhering was at once too learned and too imaginative
for his thoughts on any legal subject to be superficial or sterile. But I
would argue that this discussion of the content, or substance, of law
fails altogether in its announced intention of clarifying the objective
conditions and purposes that give rise to law and define its functions.
It does this because Jhering is never able to penetrate through and
behind the legal order, which he knew so intimately, and to see clearly
either the primitive beginnings from which law arose or the ideal
goals to which it aspires.
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The source of Jhering's power as a jurist lies in his profound and
balanced recognition at once of the distinctive character of law and
of its close association with other modes of social organization. It
was this that enabled him to grasp so effectively the notion that law
is a particular means-one among many-for the attainment of ends
that it often shares with other segments of the human enterprise.
Further, Jhering had a magnificent sense of both the capacity and
the limitations of law as a means: his analyses and evaluations of its
effectiveness as a vehicle for the furthering of various human interests
are always acute and discriminating. But he did not have a corresponding grasp of the ends to which law is properly to be directed:
his view of the purposes of law never became a complete and coherent
vision. This can perhaps be put most accurately by saying that Jhering's outlook always remained provincial. I use this term, not with
any pejorative overtones, but in the strict sense, to indicate that he
seemed unable to conceive human and social matters save in sophisticated legal terms. He could not escape from the context of law
because, though he was compellingly aware of other realms, he could
not clearly envisage them.
It is for this reason, I think, that Jhering failed to focus the attention of his contemporaries and followers on the legal problems
that he regarded as central, or to persuade them to approach law in
the very broad terms that he advocated. He did not convince them on
these matters because he could not point the way, or pose the terms,
for the accomplishments he had in mind: less adventurous spirits than
himself, they were content to cultivate ground where his ideas could
promise them immediate fruit. One can only hope that this failure is
temporary. For Jhering's convictions and intentions on these points
were sound, and law will not rest on a secure and fruitful theoretical
base until its returns to Jhering's questions and deals with them
seriously.

